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This paper examines the cases of the Early Warning System (EWS) in the Republic of 
Korea, which was introduced in the wake of 1997/98 Asian financial crisis in a policy 
effort to prevent its recurrence. The EWS in the Republic of Korea was expanded into a 
national system in 2005 incorporating the finance, real estate, commodities, and labor 
sectors. This paper provides the descriptions of each EWS sector and documents 
several episodes of their policy contributions. The past experiences suggest that 
quantitative models tend to have difficulty predicting a crisis due to the changing nature 
of crises. Hence, it is desirable that quantitative models are supplemented by qualitative 
analysis reinforcing EWSs with various methodologies. To improve economic 
surveillance and message delivery to guide proper policy actions, the independence of 
surveillance unit should be maintained and the scope of monitoring should be expanded 
to incorporate regions and markets other than domestic ones given the growing 
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An early warning system (EWS) is a monitoring system to detect the possibility of 
economic crisis in advance and to alert policy makers to take preventive actions. A 
number of international organizations, governments, central banks, and financial 
institutions operate EWSs for various purposes. For example, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) operates a system to quantitatively monitor macroeconomic vulnerabilities of 
emerging economies. Central banks and financial supervisory agencies around the 
world maintain a system to check the soundness of financial institutions and industries. 
Investment banks also operate models to forecast the possibility of extraordinary events 
in foreign exchange and other financial markets. 
 
Perhaps, one of the most active areas of EWS application is the so-called currency crisis, 
in which a country goes through a rapid loss of its currency value and foreign exchange 
reserves. Emerging economies whose currencies are not internationally accepted find 
themselves in trouble when they experience a shortage of foreign currency liquidity. 
Throughout modern economic history, a number of countries experienced a sudden stop 
or reversal of capital flows, and the consequent depreciation of their currency values. 
The syndrome is usually preceded by phenomena such as an accumulation of current 
account deficits, aggravations in foreign currency asset and/or liability positions, lax 
management of monetary or fiscal policy, or weak financial structure in the domestic 
banking sector.   
 
A wave of currency crises swept through emerging economies in South America and 
Asia during the 1990s. As a result, the Republic of Korea, with excessive short-term 
external borrowing and little foreign exchange reserves with which to defend, had to 
request a rescue fund from the IMF and underwent a sharp depreciation of its currency. 
The cost of crisis was enormous. The country’s gross domestic product (GDP) declined 
by almost 6% in 1998 and the government had to inject a huge amount of public funds 
into the economy for financial restructuring. One lesson from the crisis experience was 
that the Republic of Korea lacked the mechanism to predict and warn of upcoming crises. 
Accordingly, the need for an EWS was highlighted. In response, the Korea Center for 
International Finance (KCIF), whose sole mandate is to operate an EWS and monitor the 
possibility of crisis recurrence, was established. 
 
In an effort to further strengthen crisis monitoring, the EWS in the Republic of Korea was 
expanded in 2005 and a national system of early warning was established. This system 
encompasses seven sectors: currency, financial industry, financial market, commodities, 
petroleum, real estate, and labor. Each EWS has a unique purpose to capture the 
possibility of crisis in relevant areas and its results are collected by the central 
government for reference in the policy-making process. The crisis prevention ability of 
the Republic of Korea has been strengthened with the operation of a national EWS. 
 
The recent global financial crisis that began from the United States (US) subprime 
mortgages and spread to the rest of the world significantly impacted the economy of the 
Republic of Korea. The interest in crisis prevention has been heightened and it is 
opportune to look into how the national EWS responded to the developments of various 
crises and contributed to the policy-making processes. The Republic of Korea and other 
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Asian countries went through a number of crisis experiences and have a commonality in 
that they heavily rely on the stability of the external sector for growth. In this context, the 
lessons drawn could be useful not only to the Republic of Korea, but also to other 
entities, such as the newly established ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office 




This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, the national early warning system of the 
Republic of Korea is introduced. The policy contributions of the EWSs are reviewed in 
section 3, and the lessons learned from the operation of the EWSs are discussed in 
section 4. Section suggests future steps and conclusion. 
 
 
2.  The Early Warning System in the Republic of Korea
2 
 
The 1997/98 Asian financial crisis imposed significant costs on the economy of the 
Republic of Korea. Reflections on the crisis experience have ensued. One common 
feature of the currency crisis across the region was that whatever initial conditions there 
were in a particular country for a particular episode of the crisis, there were sudden 
changes in the flows of funds into and out of the country, and there tended to be 
speculative attacks on the currency. In response to that, the need for monitoring capital 
flows was raised in the Republic of Korea and the government established the following 
monitoring organizations and systems:
3  
 
(i)  Korea Center for International Finance with currency EWS (April 1999), 
(ii)  Online FX Flow Monitoring System (April 1999), 
(iii)  Korea Financial Intelligence Unit (November 2001), and 
(iv)  Strengthening foreign exchange (FX) position soundness by the Financial 
Supervisory Services (July 1998). 
KCIF was mandated to monitor trends in the global financial market and world economy 
in order to analyze and warn of the possibility of a currency crisis. The government also 
built an online FX flow monitoring system that relays the FX transaction and position 
information of financial institutions into the central system in real time. The Korea 
Financial Intelligence Unit (KFIU) specialized in monitoring cross-border black market 
activity such as money laundering. The Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) introduced 
gap regulations on financial institutions’ foreign currency asset and/or liability 
mismatches according to maturities and strengthened risk management on foreign 
currency funds. 
 
                                            
1  The Association of Southeast Asian Nations Plus Three (ASEAN+3) comprises the 10 member nations of 
ASEAN plus the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Japan, and the Republic of Korea. 
2  The exact composition of models, operational features, and results of the national early warning system 
are regarded as confidential information by the government of the Republic of Korea and the operating 
organizations. Thus, the description of early warning models herein are limited to publicly announced 
information and to a level that does not undermine the confidentiality requirement. 
3  C. S. Oh (2006). Early Warning Systems in the Republic of Korea |  3 
 
In early 2004, the President of the Republic of Korea launched the initiative to develop a 
national EWS in order to effectively monitor any symptoms of an economic crisis that 
may potentially affect the economy. An integrated operation of early warning systems of 
diverse areas was considered to be desirable for the effective management of crisis 
situations and for capturing contagions among interrelated sectors. The national EWS 
was established in January 2005 that incorporated seven sectors—currency, financial 
industry, financial market, commodities, petroleum, real estate, and labor—with some of 
these sectors further divided into subsectors.   
 
Each EWS has an operating agency and a government organization that oversees its 
operation as shown in Figure 1. For example, the real estate EWS is operated by the 
Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements, and the Ministry of Land, Transport, 
and Maritime Affairs is the responsible authority. The Petroleum and Commodities EWS 
is operated by the Korea National Oil Corporation and the Korea Institute for Industrial 
Economics and Trade, respectively, and the Ministry of Knowledge and Economy 
oversees their operations. 
 




FSC = Financial Services Commission; FSS = Financial Supervisory Services; KLI = Korea Labor Institute; KNOC = 
Korea National Oil Corporation; KIET = Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade; KRIHS = Korea 
Research Institute for Human Settlements, MKE = Ministry of Knowledge and Economy; MLTM = Ministry of Land, 
Transportation, and Maritime Affairs; MOEL = Ministry of Employment and Labor; MOSF = Ministry of Strategy and 
Finance.  
 




The results of each EWS are reported monthly to the Ministry of Strategy and Finance 
for central collection and are used as inputs for policy making. The results are reported 
at high-level government meetings when needed. The government also prepared a 
manual for crisis management that dictates mandatory actions by relevant government 
organizations in case of crisis situations in order to prevent a void or overlap of 
mandates, and to deal with a crisis in an effective and cooperative manner. The key 
component of the manual is that it relates the level of crisis development with the proper 
policy actions that should be taken by authorities concerned. The five levels of crisis 
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Table 1: Warning Levels and Corresponding Policy Actions 
 
Warning 
Level  Policy Action 
Normal - 
Caution  •  Tighter monitoring of domestic and global markets, and cross-border short-term capital 
flows 
•  Increase quantity and quality of information shared inside and outside of government 
for the risk factors identified 
Warning  •  Strengthen monitoring function of illegal foreign exchange (FX) transactions 
•  Higher requirement for the FX liquidity soundness of financial institutions 
•  Prepare policy action plans on risk factors identified 
•  Active sovereign investor relation (IR)     
Quasi-
Emergency 
•  Prepare contingency plans for short-term FX liquidity shortage 
•  Activate pan-government daily checking system and crisis management entity 
•  Double-check SAFEGUARD trigger conditions 
Emergency  •  Activate SAFEGUARD following predetermined trigger conditions 
 
Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance.   
 
 
2.1.  Korea Center for International Finance’s External Sector Early 
Warning System 
 
The external sector (or currency) EWS was the first to be developed among the national 
EWS and began its operation with the establishment of KCIF in April 1999. The function 
of KCIF is divided into qualitative and quantitative analyses. KCIF has several divisions 
as shown in Figure 2. Four divisions are in charge of early warning and monitoring, three 
of which provide qualitative analysis and the other provides quantitative analysis.   
 
(i) Qualitative Early Warning System 
 
The three divisions in charge of the qualitative EWS of KCIF are the market intelligence, 
research and analysis, and market monitoring divisions, as denoted in green circles in 
Figure 2. The market intelligence division covers the events of global financial markets. 
They produce reports on the trends in global foreign exchange, as well as the bond and 
stock markets, and analyze hot issues in the financial industry. The research and 
analysis division generally covers the regional economies around the world and reports 
their status at frequent intervals. Each division consists of experts who have been 
working in the relevant areas for a long time. The experts on financial markets are mostly 
ex-dealers who possess hands-on experience in financial institutions such as 
commercial banks and security companies. Their networks with other market dealers are 
also valuable assets for gathering information and making judgments about market 
situations.  
 
 Early Warning Systems in the Republic of Korea |  5 
 
Figure 2: Organization of Korea Center for International Finance 
 
EWS = Early Warning System, KCIF = Korea Center for International Finance, NY = New York. 
 
Source: KCIF’s homepage at http://www.kcif.or.kr   
 
The market monitoring division monitors what happens overnight in the overseas market 
and major foreign media, such as The Wall Street Journal and Financial Times. They 
provide quick reports of news bulletins every early morning so that policy makers and 
the general public are well informed before overseas events take any effect on the 
domestic market. Lastly, KCIF runs a branch in New York where the views of local 
economists and analysts on hot economic issues and the economy of the Republic of 
Korea are gathered and reported. 
 
(ii) Quantitative Early Warning System 
 
The quantitative currency EWS model consists of variables that turned out to be useful in 
predicting the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis. The EWS could detect the symptoms if a 
similar crisis were going to be repeated. The model employs a signaling approach of 
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) for its methodology that detects the possibility of 
crisis recurrence by tracking those variables with a leading indicator property that 
showed abnormal behaviors such as extreme surges or plunges before the 1997/98 
crisis. 
 
The model consists of 21 variables divided among 4 sectors—domestic real, domestic 
financial, external real, and external financial. The domestic real sector consists of 
indicators that show changes in macroeconomic conditions, such as industrial 
production and the dishonored bill ratio. The domestic financial sector consists of price 
indicators in bond and stock markets, and other monetary aggregates. The external real 
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sector monitors the indicators of trade flows and relative prices of traded goods, 
including export growth, current account balance, and the real exchange rate. The 
external financial sector looks into the changes in foreign currency liquidity conditions 
using the indicators of external debt and foreign investment fund flows. 
 
Individual indicators send risk signals when they pass their own thresholds, which are 
set to minimize noise-to-signal ratios
4 in predicting a crisis 12 months in advance. Then, 
a composite index is formed as a weighted average of signals of individual indicators 
where larger weights are assigned to an indicator with a lower noise-to-signal ratio. The 
composite index measures the overall risk of the external sector. Besides, the indexes 
for the four sectors are also formed to gauge the risks of each sector. The monthly report 
contains the results of a composite index, sectoral indexes, and the risk signals of 
individual indicators so that the risks in each aggregate level—overall, sectoral, and 
individual—are conveyed separately. 
 
The quantitative early warning model is accompanied by qualitative analysis. Each 
month when the result of the quantitative model is reported, a more in-depth qualitative 
analysis on the domestic economy and financial market is provided. The qualitative 
analysis may be on a particular risk signal of the model indicator or any other risk factors 
of the economy. This has the merit of supplementing the quantitative model with detailed 
explanations as to how certain risk factors are developing. It can also somewhat address 
the problem of important risk signals getting watered down by other normal signals in the 
model, which tends to happen usually in the early stages of a crisis. 
 
In early 2008, the quantitative EWS went through an extensive renovation as the 
developments of the crisis from the US subprime mortgage market deepened. First, the 
existing model was upgraded in order to enhance the model’s sensitivity in risk 
detections. The model indicators’ thresholds and noise-to-signal ratios were reestimated 
so that the recent changes in the indicators’ behaviors were better reflected.   
 
Moreover, three new models were added to the quantitative EWS in order to capture the 
development of a crisis from various angles. A model based on the episodes of other 
countries’ currency crises was introduced to capture the patterns of currency crises that 
are similar to the early 1990s crisis in the European Monetary Union and Mexico’s 
experience in the mid-1990s, among others. Another model to capture the possibility of 
domestic crises was also introduced, which is based on those crisis episodes that 
happened in the Republic of Korea after the 1997/98 crisis, such as the credit card 
bubble burst in 2003/04 and real estate market overheating in 2006. While the natures of 
these crises were domestic, the model was included since even the domestic events can 
bring about problems in the external sector when they are seriously aggravated. Finally, 
a rather discretionary model was introduced that is composed of risk factors that the 
economy might encounter in the near future. In this model, the choice of the indicators is 
discretionary rather than based on objective selection criteria, such as the noise-to-
signal ratio, since new risks may not have past episodes. 
                                            
4  A noise-to-signal ratio is the ratio between false alarms and true signals. A true signal occurs when an 
indicator sends a risk signal during a crisis period. Similarly, a false alarm occurs when an indicator 
sends a risk signal during a noncrisis period. Early Warning Systems in the Republic of Korea |  7 
 
Along with these renovations, a qualitative judgment process has been incorporated into 
the quantitative EWS. A committee of economic experts from the economic research 
institute, central bank, and the FSS was organized to make a final decision when there 
was a significant difference among the results of the four models. A simple summary of a 
quantitative EWS is illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Quantitative Early Warning System of Korea Center for International 
Finance 
 
Model Crisis  Episodes  Indicators    
    
’97 Currency   
Crisis  1997 currency crisis 
21 indicators including 
terms of trade, external debts,   





1994–95 Latin America, 
1999 Russia 
19 indicators including 
domestic credit, oil prices,   
overseas interest rates, etc. 
 
New Crisis 
2003–04 Credit card 
bubble, 2006 Real   
estate market bubble 
8 indicators including 
housing prices,   
household debts, etc. 
 
Near Crisis  Recent risk factors, e.g.,






EMU = European Monetary Union. 
 
 
2.2.  Other Early Warning Systems
5 
 
(i) Financial Industry (Market) Early Warning System 
 
The financial industry EWS is operated by the FSS and is largely composed of a daily 
handy indicator evaluation system and quarterly EWS. A handy indicator system utilizes 
a small number of real-time variables that are reported daily from financial institutions to 
the FSS. It focuses on key variables that reflect the soundness, profitability, and liquidity 
of financial institutions. The handy indicator system is run by a number of internal 
supervisory departments of the FSS and is collected by the EWS team for monthly 
reporting. 
                                            
5  The descriptions of other EWSs depend on Baek’s (2009) collection of government documents on 
sectoral EWSs. 8   |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 77 
 
The quarterly EWS consists of 6 indexes: risk index, leading risk index, statistical CAEL,
6 
capital adequacy prediction model, credit rating prediction model, and expected default 
frequency model. The risk index and leading risk index are applied to nine financial 
industrial sectors, including banking, life insurance, liability insurance, securities, asset 
management, credit cards, installment financing, savings banks, and credit unions. Five 
indexes, with the exception of the leading risk index, are applied to individual financial 
institutions in each industrial sector so that hundreds of indexes are produced for 
monitoring. 
 
The risk index covers the important aspects of financial soundness and financial 
institution management, such as capital adequacy, asset quality, profitability, and liquidity. 
It is composed of related indicators, including capital adequacy ratio, nonperforming loan 
ratio, net interest margin, and domestic and foreign currency liquidity ratios, with some 
variations in the composition of indicators according to the type of industry. This index is 
the most comprehensive and representative among the six quarterly indexes.   
 
While the risk index measures the current soundness of the financial industry and 
institutions, the leading risk index is designed to measure the probability of future crisis 
by mainly using macroeconomic variables such as GDP growth rate, inflation rate, and 
corporate bond yields, among others.   
  
The other indexes measure the risk with respect to a particular aspect of financial 
soundness in more detail. Operating various models and methodologies also has the 
merit of mitigating the errors that are more likely than when operating a single model. 
Statistical CAEL assesses the capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings, and liquidity of 
financial institutions from a purely statistical approach. The capital adequacy prediction 
model applies a logit model to predict the single most important indicator of financial 
soundness. The credit rating prediction model applies an ordered probit model to 
forecast the possible changes in market evaluations on a particular financial institution. 
The expected default frequency model incorporates information from balance sheets and 
the stock market to evaluate the probability of default of a financial institution.   
 
The structure of the financial industry’s quarterly EWS is summarized in Table 2. One 
important aspect of the financial industry EWS is that the management of the financial 
industry has been generally sound since the 1997/98 crisis and the samples for a high-
risk period are somewhat limited, which poses difficulty in securing the significance of 
estimation models. 
 
The financial market EWS operates a model composed of five sectors and 30 variables 
to measure macroeconomic and monetary conditions, and monitor anomalies in the 
financial market. The monetary and finance sector detects the symptoms of excessive 
credit expansion and rapid flow of funds for short-term overheating using indicators such 
as M2 growth rate, loan growth, etc. The stock market sector monitors the foreign 
investment fund flows into the stock market and evaluates the appropriateness of stock 
price level through dividend-yield rate. The macroeconomic sector tracks the changes in 
the conditions of real economy and business cycle phases. The foreign sector consists 
                                            
6  Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Earnings, and Liquidity (CAEL). Early Warning Systems in the Republic of Korea |  9 
 
of indicators in international financial markets such as stock price index, credit spread, 
exchange rate, and differentials between domestic and foreign interest rates that affect 
the flow of funds across the border of the country. Finally, the instability sector is 
composed of volatility of stock prices, volatility of stock transaction volumes, term spread, 
and dishonored bill ratio, etc. to detect the anomalies in the domestic financial market. 
 
Table 2: Financial Supervisory Services Quarterly Early Warning System 
 
 Model  Banking Life 
Ins. 
Liab 










Risk Index  O  O  O  O  O  O  O  O  O  Industry 
Leading Risk 
Index 
O O  O  O O  O  O O   
Risk Index  O  O  O  O  O  O  O  O  O 




O O  O  O O  O  O O   
Credit Rating 
Prediction 





O O  O   O  O       
 
CAEL = capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings, and profitability, Fin.= Finance, Install.=Installment, Ins.=Insurance, 
Liab.=Liability, Mgmt.=Management, Sec. = Securities. 
 
Source: Shin-dong Jung, and Mi-young Lee (2008), pp.8.   
 
(ii) Real Estate Early Warning System 
 
The real estate EWS is composed of national and regional models. Regional models 
cover those regions where real estate prices rise fast so that there is a high probability of 
overheating in the market, such as the metropolitan area around Seoul. National and 
regional models are each divided into a housing prices model and a land prices model. 
Both nonparametric and parametric methodologies are employed in the real estate EWS. 
A signaling approach is applied to the national model and a probit model is applied to 
regional models.   
 
The national model tracks leading indicators of the real estate market such as financial 
institutions’ liquidity, stock price index, interest rates, construction orders, industrial 
production, and other related indicators. The risk level of the market is assessed 
considering the number of indicators that exceed thresholds. The thresholds are set 
distinguishing when the market is expanding from when it is contracting, reflecting the 
fact that indicators’ behaviors can change according to the business cycle. The regional 10   |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 77 
 
models utilize similar macroeconomic variables as in the national model, but with a 
number of additional regional variables that show factors unique to each region (e.g., 
regional real estate transactions, construction orders).   
 
The real estate EWS is characteristic in that it formally incorporates a qualitative decision 
process in its EWS. A committee composed of experts from the real estate industry, 
academe, and the government meets once a month and determines the level of warning, 
taking into account both the quantitative model results and the market situation as the 
committee members perceive it.   
 
(iii) Commodities Early Warning System 
 
The commodities EWS comprises two components: petroleum and the other 
commodities EWSs. The petroleum EWS applies an artificial neural network model to 
monitor indicators that influence world oil market prices such as the US petroleum 
inventory, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (OPEC) level of 
production, US industrial production, and noncommercial net long positions in futures 
contracts on crude oil (Yoon et al. 2004). However, the predictability of such a 
quantitative model is inevitably limited since oil prices are easily affected by 
noneconomic factors like natural disasters, war, terrorism, and OPEC’s production policy.   
 
One feature of the petroleum EWS is that the results are released to the public so that 
media, industry, and interested individuals can make use of them. Such an open 
approach is possible in the petroleum EWS because oil prices are determined in the 
world market and there is almost no way that the economy of the Republic of Korea can 
endogenously affect the prices.
7  
 
The EWS is also applied to various other commodities such as iron, non-iron metals, 
and petrochemical materials. Various indicators are monitored—such as business cycle 
indicators of the US and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), inventories of 
commodities, commodities futures prices, and the freight charge index—as they 
influence the world economic conditions and commodity prices. However, the 
predictability is limited again in that the commodity prices can be also affected by non-
economic factors. In order to mitigate such problems, the government consults with 
relevant industrial associations and research institutes on the result of the EWS when it 
is deemed necessary.   
 
(iv) Labor Early Warning System 
 
The labor EWS is divided into two models that predict the employment rate and labor– 
management relations. The employment rate EWS comprises the sectors that reflect the 
stages of the business cycle—such as production, investment, consumption, and 
trade—which form the conditions for changes in employment. The model is designed to 
predict major aggravations in employment 3 months in advance to increase the accuracy 
of warning signals. 
                                            
7  In 2010, the government switched its policy to operate the petroleum EWS only internally. Yoon et al. 
(2004). Early Warning Systems in the Republic of Korea |  11 
 
The operation of the labor–management relations EWS is rather unique and it was 
introduced because relations between labor and management in the Republic of Korea 
used to be one of the worst in the world as measured by the International Institute for 
Management Development (IMD) World Competitiveness Yearbook. The EWS keeps 
track of indicators that show the status of labor–management relations, including the 
number of strikes in each industry and region, yearly changes in strike occurrences, and 




3.  Policy Contributions of Early Warning Systems 
 
This chapter introduces several cases of EWS performance with respect to crisis 
predictions. Several episodes of crisis are illustrated, varying in their type and timing, 
with a general focus on the performances of EWSs preceding the recent global financial 
crisis. The documentation covers both satisfactory and unsatisfactory aspects of EWS 
performances, and explanations for their respective performances are given. 
 
3.1.  Korea Center for International Finance’s External Sector Early 
Warning System 
 
In regard to the prediction of the recent crisis, the currency EWS performed its early 
warning function both in qualitative and quantitative terms, with more weight on the 
qualitative side. It is not surprising that it had to largely rely on the qualitative EWS 
considering the very different nature of the recent crisis from that of the 1997/98 Asian 
financial crisis. While the 1997/98 crisis was caused by domestic problems such as 
deterioration in the financial structure of the corporate and banking sectors, the recent 
crisis originated from financial failures in some systemically important economies and 
spread to the domestic economy of the Republic of Korea through a global credit crunch. 
Therefore, the quantitative model based on the experience of the 1997/98 Asian financial 
crisis had limited predictive value. 
 
(i) Qualitative Early Warning System 
 
As the symptoms of the financial crisis deepened (Figure 4), KCIF reinforced monitoring 
on domestic and international financial markets. KCIF reported to the government the 
trends and important events in the market, their outlooks and the expected impacts on 
the domestic economy, and policy implications. The center also supported the 
government by participating in governmental meetings, including emergency meetings 
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Figure 4: Development of the Global Financial Crisis 




Source: Morgan Stanley Capital International–All Country World Index (MSCI–ACWI), (Local). 
 
 
Table 3 provides some examples of qualitative analysis that warned of the coming crisis. 
KCIF warned of the possibility of a credit crunch due to aggravations of funding 
conditions caused by the deterioration of asset qualities of major financial institutions. 
Right after the provision of rescue funds to Bear Stearns in March 2008, KCIF pointed 
out the possibility of a similar phenomenon affecting other investment banks. It also 
reported that the establishment of the Resolution Trust Corporation
8 was being viewed 
as a way of injecting public funds into financial institutions for the resolution of bad 
assets. KCIF reported the results of its performance analysis of major investment banks, 
including Lehman Brothers, and urged the authorities to pay attention to possible write-
offs and deleveraging by them. It also relayed the worries in the financial market that 
Lehman Brothers was in the weakest position among its peers if there were to be a 







                                            
8  A type of asset management company established in 1989 to liquidate the insolvent assets of savings and loan 
associations. 
Index Early Warning Systems in the Republic of Korea |  13 
 
Table 3: Examples of Qualitative Warnings before the Global Financial Crisis 
 
Title   Date  
The response of major financial institutions to the subprime crisis    5 Feb 2008 
Recession worries in the midst of the credit crunch      4 Mar 2008 
The possibility of further aggravations of subprime mortgages    6 Mar 2008 
Rescue of Bear Stearns and Future Outlook    17 Mar 2008 
Global credit crunch spillover    28 Mar 2008 
Major international banks’ write-offs and their effects    21 Apr 2008 
The 2nd quarter major international banks’ performance and outlook    17 Jun 2008 
Global banks’ bad asset accumulations and their effects    20 Jun 2008 
Reemergence of the credit crisis and international financial market turmoil  1 Jul 2008 
Risk factors in domestic financial market and policy measures    14 Jul 2008 
Risks of US banks’ bankruptcy    28 Jul 2008 
Local views of US housing market, oil prices, and dollars    29 Aug 2008 
 
Source: Korea Center for International Finance’s homepage at http://www.kcif.or.kr   
 
Immediately following the announcement of emergency support measures for Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac in July 2008, KCIF produced reports showing that the soundness 
and stability of financial institutions—such as Lehman Brothers, Wachovia, Merrill Lynch, 
as well as savings and loans associations like Washington Mutual and other regional 
banks—were being threatened. In August, the center reported to the government about 
the views of Wall Street experts on the Korea Development Bank’s (KDB) attempt to take 
over Lehman Brothers. The New York branch of KCIF reported the negative views 
among Wall Street financial experts about KDB’s potential acquisition and the concerns 
that, if realized, it would undermine the stability and privatization process of KDB 
because of Lehman Brothers’ vast holdings of toxic mortgage-backed assets. The report 
was sent to KCIF about 2 weeks before the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Eventually, 
KDB gave up its plan to acquire Lehman Brothers. 
 
Besides the monitoring efforts during the period of deepening global financial crisis, 
KCIF did not loosen its attention on the way to gradual recovery. KCIF kept track of the 
money markets of major banks in advanced countries and analyzed the effects of 
governments’ and central banks’ emergency liquidity supply to the credit-crunched 
market. It also helped the government of the Republic of Korea and financial institutions 
by reporting the market conditions for issuing bonds overseas as financial markets 
gradually recovered. KCIF continued to release analyses on imminent issues in global 
financial markets and the world economy such as the possibility of crisis in Eastern 
European economies, risks in US commercial mortgages, and deterioration in the public 
finances of major advanced economies. 
 
KCIF’s ramped-up monitoring efforts are evident in the increase of the number of reports 
produced. The number of reports, including issue analysis, daily reports, and others, 14   |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 77 
 
increased from 1,642 in 2007 to 1,988 in 2008 and 2,189 in 2009. Regarding information 
on global financial markets and the world economy, KCIF has become quite the 
information hub in the economic community of the Republic of Korea, and a number of 
public organizations, economic research institutes, and financial institutions have relied 
on KCIF’s swift and timely coverage of rapidly changing market situations. 
 
(ii) Quantitative Early Warning System 
 
While EWSs largely rely on qualitative analysis that directly monitors the relevant areas 
of financial markets and regional economies, as mentioned earlier, the quantitative EWS 
had some difficulties in predicting the recent global financial crisis that originated from 
abroad. Some reasons can be found in the nature of the quantitative model and the 
domestic economic conditions before the crisis. First, composed mainly of domestic 
indicators reflecting the nature of the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis, the model had limits 
in capturing the changes in the markets outside the economy of the Republic of Korea. 
Moreover, the sound operation of the domestic economy following the 1997/98 crisis 
somewhat overshadowed several important risk signals produced in the quantitative 
model.  
 
The quantitative model’s performance regarding prediction of the 1997/98 Asian financial 
crisis and the recent global financial crisis can be compared. Since the model was based 
on the 1997/98 crisis, the composite index produced warning signals about a year before 
the 1997/98 crisis. However, with respect to the recent crisis, the model failed to produce 
such sensitive responses. Although the composite index ratcheted up with the growing 
symptoms of global financial turmoil, the risk signals of troubled indicators were watered 
down by normal signals from other indicators. As a result, the warning levels were not as 
high as they were before the 1997/98 crisis. 
 
However, the quantitative model still captured some symptoms of the upcoming crisis. 
Even though there was a rather unsatisfactory aspect in the performance of the 
composite index as explained above, the model emitted signals in a number of important 
individual indicators that were closely related with the crisis. Before the crisis, the 
domestic economy and its main components, such as financial institutions and 
corporations, were in general regarded to be sound, but it was pointed out that a rapid 
increase in short-term external debts and consequent aggravations in the foreign 
currency positions of the banking sector posed some vulnerability to the economy of the 
Republic of Korea.   
 
The model emitted risk signals for indicators mainly in the external financial sector that 
are related to external debts and foreign currency liquidity. The indicators—such as the 
ratio of short-term external debt to foreign exchange reserves, the ratio of external debt 
to exports, and financial institutions’ foreign currency asset and/or liability positions—
emitted warning signals a long time before the crisis occurred. The current account 
balance also showed risk signals as it worsened due to a hike in oil prices. Other 
indicators, such as the volatility of exchange rate and stock prices, sent signals during 
the contagion phase of the crisis.   
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Furthermore, the warning signals of individual indicators were studied by the quantitative 
EWS division. While the qualitative analyses of other divisions of KCIF focus largely on 
overseas economic events, the EWS division produced its own qualitative reports on the 
risk factors of the domestic economy. With qualitative reports, the EWS division analyzed 
the aggravations of the current account balance due to a hike in commodity prices and 
the appreciation of the won. It also analyzed the capital inflows due to arbitrage trades of 
foreign investors and warned of the possibility of a sudden transition to outflows. It also 
addressed the phenomenon of rapid external debt accumulations during the years 
before the crisis and the transition from a net external creditor to a net debtor position. 
Such analyses could be utilized as an important tool to predict the economic outlook, 



























Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Return On Assets (ROA). 




                                            
9  Further renovations have been made since the draft was written in 2010. They are based on the lessons 
and future steps to be explained below in Sections 4 and 5. An index composed of key structural 
indicators of the external sector such as current account balance and short-term external debt to foreign 
reserves ratio has been introduced to sensitively capture structural weaknesses. Indexes composed of 
international and domestic financial indicators such as stock price volatility, credit spreads, and exchange 
rate volatility have been also added to the system. These renovations rendered the EWS capable of 
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3.2.  Other Early Warning Systems 
 
(i) Financial Market and Industry Early Warning System 
 
The banking industry of the Republic of Korea went through massive restructurings after 
the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis as the weak performance of the finance sector was 
identified as one of the culprits of the crisis. Banks were merged with or acquired by 
other banks in the process of resolving bad assets, and financial supervision was 
strengthened. As a result, the financial industry improved its structure considerably. 
Banks’ capital adequacy ratios increased from 7.0% in 1997 to 12.0% in 2007, and 
profitability measured in terms of return on assets improved significantly from –0.9% to 
1.1% during the same period. Largely, the financial industry has maintained its 
soundness throughout the last decade and the financial EWS helped complement the 
supervision of the health of the financial industry and its institutions.   
 
The soundness of the financial industry during the last decade made it hard for the EWS 
to detect a significant problem before the occurrence of the global financial crisis. Also, 
the financial industry EWS has insufficient capacity to predict the possibility of future 
deterioration even though it is well composed of indicators in terms of monitoring the 
current soundness of financial institutions. In order to supplement these inadequacies, 
the prediction capability of the models has been reinforced through incorporating 
indicators related to asset growth since potential insolvencies tend to accumulate when 
the size of financial institutions expands rapidly. 
 
(ii) Real Estate Early Warning System 
 
The Republic of Korea is a country of high population density, and land prices are 
subsequently high. The wealth of ordinary households consists mostly of real estate 
assets, of which the main component is housing. The trends in the housing market and 
policy changes are always hot-button issues in the country and the general public has a 
very high level of awareness with respect to these issues.     
 
The economy of the Republic of Korea experienced a rapid rise in housing prices during 
the last decade. Nationwide housing prices, which fell more than 10% during the 
recession in the aftermath of the 1997/98 financial crisis, began to rise from the early 
2000s, owing to the shortage of housing units in the Seoul metropolitan area and a low 
interest rate monetary policy. Housing prices rose 9.9% in 2001 and 16.9% in 2002. 
Prices further rose 4.0% in 2005 and 11.6% in 2006. The rise in housing prices was 
especially worrisome since household borrowing was rising rapidly through mortgage 
loans. A vicious cycle formed where an increase in loans and demand for housing 
caused higher housing prices, which in turn led to more borrowing by households. 
 
The government introduced measures to calm down the overheated housing market and 
regulations were placed on housing loans.
10 The government limited the debt-to-income 
                                            
10  A series of policy measures to restrain real estate market overheating was introduced in 2006 and 2007. Early Warning Systems in the Republic of Korea |  17 
 
(DTI) ratio
11 to below 40% and strengthened the application of the loan-to-value (LTV) 
ratio
12 to 40% in the speculative areas where the housing market was overheating. The 
government also imposed other regulations on real estate transactions. The real estate 
EWS contributed to the process of policy making by pointing out the abnormal pace of 
increases in housing prices on a national level and in the so-called Gangnam area,
13 
where the market was the most overheated. 
 
Figure 6A: Housing Prices in the Republic of Korea (y-o-y %) 
 
 

















Source: Kookmin Bank.   
 











         Source:  Ministry  of  Land,  Transportation,  and  Maritime  Affairs.  
 
                                            
11  The ratio of the annual repayment of principal and interest of a housing loan divided by annual income of 
the household.   
12  The ratio of a housing loan divided by the value of housing. 
13  The Gangnam area is the southern part of Seoul where the residential environment and educational 
opportunities are superior to other regions. The housing prices in this area rose much faster than in other 
regions. For example, in 2005 and 2006, prices in Gangnam rose by 15.1% and 24.5%, respectively, 
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The real estate market has risks in both directions—not only when it overheats, but also 
when it declines. The recent crisis brought recession to the economy and the housing 
market was no exception. Housing prices fell for the first time in several years and the 
number of unsold housing units rose. The government released a series of real estate 
policy measures to guide the housing market to a soft landing, and the real estate EWS 
contributed to the proper policy direction by alerting policy makers of weaknesses in the 
construction industry.   
 
The real estate EWS is generally regarded to be effective in policy contributions. One 
important reason is that the real estate EWS is balanced between quantitative and 
qualitative processes. By incorporating a qualitative decision process in the EWS, it did 
not merely rely on the results of quantitative models but could flexibly deal with the 
status of the real estate market by reflecting the opinions of experts. Another 
circumstantial reason may be the high level of alertness in the real estate sector. If a 
crisis occurs once a decade, it would be difficult to expect changes in trends after a long 
period of peace. Probably, the frequent experience of crisis—and near-crisis situations of 
rapidly rising house prices—helped make the real estate EWS responsive to market 
realities. 
 
(iii) Petroleum Early Warning System 
 
As is well known, the Republic of Korea’s economy depends heavily on commodities 
imported from abroad. Crude oil makes up almost 20% of total imports and changes in 
oil prices have extensive effects on the economy of the Republic of Korea through 
changes in the current account and inflation, for example. The economy of the Republic 
of Korea is a price-taker in the world oil market and thus has to take any shocks to the 
price of oil. In 2008, when the oil price had surged to $140 per barrel, the Republic of 
Korea’s current account surplus shrank sharply to $3.2 billion from $21.8 billion in the 
previous year.   
 
The petroleum EWS has contributed to policy making on a number of occasions. When 
oil prices showed symptoms of a rapid increase in the 2000s, the petroleum EWS sent 
warning signals to the authorities and helped them to prepare policy measures in 
advance. The petroleum EWS sent warning signals during the first half of 2006 when the 
price of oil rose to $70 per barrel from around $50 at the end of the previous year.   
 
The EWS also sent warning signals from the middle of 2007 as the price of oil continued 
to rise owing to increases in speculation in the oil market, the weak US dollar, and strong 
demand in fast-growing emerging economies. The warning continued as oil prices hit 
historically high levels in early 2008 and contributed in bringing forth policy measures, 
such as an oil tax cut, to mitigate the oil price shock. Finally the warning level went down 
in late 2008 as the price of oil plummeted due to the worldwide recession triggered by 
the recent global financial crisis. In late 2009, the petroleum EWS showed warning 
signals again as the price of oil began to rise along with the recovery of global business 
cycles. The recent performance of the petroleum EWS is illustrated in Figure 7. 
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Key lessons learned through the experience of EWS operations in the Republic of Korea 
are presented below. These lessons may sound familiar, but they are worth pointing out 
once again since such basic principles are forgotten occasionally in the process of 
surveillance. 
 
(i) Limits of Quantitative Analysis 
 
Quantitative models tend to have difficulty predicting crises due to the changing nature of 
crises. Models are designed based on the experiences of past crises in order to secure 
samples, but the patterns of crises are prone to change when they do occur. This was 
also the case with the recent global financial crisis. The impact of the 1997/98 Asian 
financial crisis on the economy of the Republic of Korea was largely the result of 
domestic problems, such as the deterioration of the financial structure of the banking 
sector caused by corporations’ excessive borrowing for unprofitable business projects, 
accumulation of current account deficits, and expansion of short-term external debts by 
financial institutions.
14 Therefore, the model was mainly composed of indicators that 
showed the status of the domestic economy in order to detect the symptoms of a similar 
crisis happening.   
 
However, the recent crisis occurred with the burst of bubbles in the US housing market 
and the deterioration in the quality of assets possessed by financial institutions in 
advanced economies. The model composed of domestic indicators could detect the 
crisis only at the contagion phase when there were large-scale withdrawals of foreign 
                                            
14  There is plenty of literature that covers the 1997/98 currency crisis of the Republic of Korea. We referred 
to Koh et al. (2007) for the domestic economic backgrounds before the crisis. 20   |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 77 
 
investment out of the local financial market and foreign currency liquidity had already 
been significantly affected.   
 
The basic problem with quantitative analysis is that it is hard to design a model to predict 
new crises without previous similar episodes. Since there are no samples of how 
indicators behaved before and during the crisis, the methodologies to select relevant 
indicators for the prediction of crises cannot be applied. One might try a simple and 
intuitive model at the cost of methodological rigor, but the physical time and cost needed 
to build a new model are not negligible either. Analyzing quantitatively the events of 
overseas markets and economies may require too many objects for monitoring, 
overwhelming researchers with such a large dataset. 
 
Quantitative analysis has certain merits. It provides objective, numerical results that are 
not influenced by researchers’ subjective views. Since the results are suggested as an 
index or probability, it is easy to understand and compare them with other periods. 
However, due to the difficulties and rigidities in applying the methodologies to changing 
economic environments, it is desirable that quantitative models are always 
supplemented by qualitative analysis. 
 
(ii) Limits of Qualitative Analysis 
 
The importance of qualitative analysis cannot be overemphasized. The merit of 
qualitative analysis is that it can cope with urgent issues in the economy in a very flexible 
manner since it looks directly into the sector or market in trouble. Regarding the recent 
crisis, qualitative analysis could capture a number of early symptoms of the crisis’ 
development and warn of its occurrence to some degree, as mentioned in Section 3. 
 
Although it is an effective monitoring tool, qualitative analysis also has difficulty 
predicting event risk. To predict whether a crisis will happen or not is extremely difficult 
since in many cases, crisis comes in a form of discrete, specific occurrence. For 
example, before the collapse of Lehman Brothers that triggered the recent global 
financial crisis, it was generally expected that the US authorities would rescue Lehman 
Brothers in a similar manner they dealt with Bear Stearns earlier in 2008 for the 
protection of transactions. The decision of US authorities to let Lehman Brothers go 
bankrupt could be called a policy mistake, considering its effect on global financial 
markets and the world economy. It is very hard to predict such a crisis triggered by event 
risk even with qualitative analysis, not to mention quantitative models. 
 
However, a more fundamental problem exists with the qualitative approach. In spite of 
monitoring efforts through qualitative analysis, it often turns out that such qualitative 
warnings are not taken seriously. There is a tendency for qualitatively written reports to 
be treated only as one of many economic reports that are produced by a number of 
economic research institutes, and thus policy makers do not take proper actions. It is 
generally thought that qualitative analyses are prone to the subjective bias of 
researchers despite their merits.   
One important reason for this can be found in the ways qualitative analyses provide 
assessments of economic events. Too often, they suggest the possibilities of both good Early Warning Systems in the Republic of Korea |  21 
 
and bad outcomes of an event, so that the readers do not come to a definitive sense of 
the future outlook. For example, one simply ends up enumerating both optimistic and 
pessimistic views of the market outlook, or presenting the conclusion of an analysis in an 
ambiguous manner. For example: “It is expected that the market situations will not 
further aggravate thanks to the policy measures, but the possibility of extreme results 
cannot be ruled out.” Therefore, policy makers have difficulty in making a judgment about 
the seriousness of an event. 
 
Regarding this ambiguity problem with qualitative analysis, it is worth pointing out that, 
unlike quantitative monitoring systems, there usually is no guideline that connects the 
assessed seriousness of market situations and the appropriate policy actions to be taken. 
Absence of such a link can be a reason that qualitative monitoring does not necessarily 
lead to the actual implementation of policy.   
 
(iii) Persistent Maintenance Efforts Required 
 
EWSs require constant efforts and attention in order to operate properly. The recent 
crisis raised interest in EWSs in a number of Asian countries, and some of them are 
trying to incorporate an EWS into their current surveillance systems. However, one 
mistake those pursuing the establishment of an EWS are apt to make is that once the 
EWS is built, its designers might not make enough effort to maintain and upgrade the 
system.  
 
Early warning with respect to the economy is very different from early warning on 
engineering objects. Economic surveillance cannot be mechanical in the same manners 
as fire or gas detectors since the structure of the economy and the behavior of its agents 
are always changing and evolving. Therefore, after the establishment of an EWS, 
subsequent checkups and maintenance of the system should be followed. The worst-
case scenario occurs when an EWS is operated mechanically without much feedback 
from policy making and without efforts to narrow the gap between the model and 
economic realities. In order to operate the system properly, some sense of ownership 
and responsibility is required. The government often entrusts the development and 
operation of an EWS to economic research institutes. The economic research institutes 
that are not very interested in EWS operations relegate the mission to junior researchers 
who just produce and relay the results mechanically. As a result, when the government 
needs further inquiries into the EWS, it is not properly advised. 
 
Some EWSs are operated within a government office after the model has been 
developed by outsourcing. In this case, the government officials in charge often run into 
technical trouble due to lack of professional knowledge. The frequent reassignment of 
positions also hampers accumulation of experience and know-how. 
 
Finally, one should be cautioned against a tendency to build an EWS without enough 
data. The importance of data should come first before the establishment of an EWS. 
From time to time, some government offices try to build EWSs without having a large 
enough dataset. In this case, there is the possibility that the EWS will not cover all 
relevant aspects of the economy for detecting crises. Without sufficient data, one is not 22   |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 77 
 
equipped with the proper measures of the economy that allow for gauging the situation 
in a balanced manner.   
 
(iv) Signals Are Warnings of the Preconditions for Crisis 
  
The statement above applies to both the staff operating an EWS and policy makers. 
While the generally recognized problem with the performance of EWSs regarding the 
prediction of the recent global financial crisis is that there was lack of advance warning, 
there could be some tendency among operating staff and policy makers involved to 
hesitate to accept the warning signals and take the subsequent policy actions. After the 
crisis has already happened, everything is clear: the origin of the crisis, the route of crisis 
development, and its impact. However, it is very hard to tell before the crisis whether the 
situation will actually develop into a crisis or not. A tendency could develop to hesitate to 
accept the warning signals because taking subsequent policy actions would be onerous.   
 
In order to avoid such temptations, one needs to interpret the results of an EWS as a 
warning of the vulnerabilities and risks the economy is encountering. Since the 
prediction of exact timing of a crisis is extremely difficult, the signals should be taken as 
warnings of the preconditions that make the occurrence of crisis more likely and imminent. 
History repeatedly teaches us that a crisis, if realized, incurs enormous costs to the 
economy and an EWS cannot help but bear the risks of alarming unrealized events.   
 
Moreover, in order to persuade policy makers to accept the warning signals and take 
preventive actions, the EWS results should be presented in a convincing manner with 
clear explanations of the (i) sources of vulnerabilities, (ii) shocks that may affect the 
economy, (iii) channels through which such shocks might propagate across the economy, 
and (iv) appropriate policy prescriptions to deal with such risks. 
 
(v) Confidential Operation Is Proper 
 
It is proper to operate an EWS in a confidential manner rather than open its results to the 
general public. If EWS results are released to the public, it may be difficult to exclude the 
possibility that the results affect the market, occasionally with significant impacts. The 
problem lies in the public nature of an EWS. Run by the government and authorities, 
those results may be taken too seriously while they are only part of various information 
inputs that policy makers take into account. Further, it is probable that frequent 
overestimations or underestimations of quantitative EWS results would be taken as 
official positions of the authorities. 
 
(vi) Sound Economic Operation Is the Key 
 
This obvious lesson is the key to the stability of the economy and financial markets. 
However, that we witness crises recur from time to time means that such obvious 
lessons are easily forgotten in practice.   
 
The lesson that came home to the Republic of Korea through the 1997/98 Asian financial 
crisis and more recent global financial crisis was that maintaining the soundness of the Early Warning Systems in the Republic of Korea |  23 
 
economy is the most fundamental way to cope with a crisis. If sectors that comprise the 
economy have weak structures and are vulnerable to shocks, the economy will not be 
able to overcome hardships or stresses caused by crises easily. Early warning is a 
useful tool that helps prevent extreme events, but sometimes the problems may not be 
prevented even with an EWS since structural weaknesses are not easily cured in a short 
period. 
 
The Republic of Korea might have been one of the most successful countries in coping 
with the recent crisis thanks to its sound economic structures. Financial institutions are 
well capitalized and their loan assets are sound with only a small percentage of bad 
assets. Unlike most advanced countries that suffer from large budget deficits and public 
debts, the Republic of Korea’s public finances are pretty healthy with its public-debt-to-
GDP ratio among the lowest in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). The country has also accumulated significant foreign exchange 
reserves, which are the world’s sixth in size.
15 The sound structure of the economy 
provided room to absorb the shocks and allowed the government to take preventive and 
aggressive policy measures to cope with the crisis. 
 
3.4. Future  Steps 
 
So far we have discussed the performances of the EWS in several cases of crises in the 
Republic of Korea and the lessons drawn from the experiences of EWS operations. 
Below are some future steps that are being planned or considered to reflect these 
lessons. The direction is toward improving quantitative and qualitative monitoring, and 
enhancing the linkage between warning messages and policy actions.   
 
We divide this discussion on surveillance mechanisms into two categories: (i) economic 
and financial monitoring, and (ii) message delivery and policy guidance. In the first, we 
discuss how the economic and financial monitoring process can be improved in terms of 
fulfilling its functions of identifying a specific country’s economic vulnerabilities and risks, and 
recommending necessary policy responses.   
 
The discussions in the second category are on the framework for effective delivery of 
surveillance outcomes and desirable organizational structure to ensure better policy 
guidance. We insist that the major outcomes of surveillance activities should be 
delivered to stakeholders through relevant channels for contributions to policy making 
and capacity building through peer review. We also argue that the independence of a 
surveillance unit make the realization of a recommended policy more likely and practical.   
 
The suggestions contained in this will be generally applicable to any national 
surveillance unit operating an EWS. It is hoped that the following suggestions would be 
useful not only to countries seeking to establish an EWS, but also the newly established 
ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic and Research Office (AMRO) as an independent regional 
surveillance vehicle to support the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM). 
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3.5.  Economic and Financial Monitoring   
 
(i) Expand the Scope of Monitoring 
 
The world economy is becoming more and more integrated as the trade and financial 
linkages between economies grow due to factors such as the deepening division of 
production processes and cross-border holdings of assets that originate from different 
regions and markets. The economy of the Republic of Korea has been closely integrated 
with the rest of the world. For example, the Republic of Korea’s external trade-to-GNI 
ratio rose from 67.1% in 2002 to 98.6% in 2009.
16 The economy also has high degree of 
openness in the capital market
17 and liberalization in foreign exchange transactions.   
 
Therefore, what happens in the global economy and financial markets has become more 
important and can exert a rapid influence on the domestic economy. As witnessed during 
the recent crisis, the economy of the Republic of Korea—despite its by-and-large sound 
operation—suffered through a recession and credit crunch because of problems that 
occurred outside its own economy. With the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis, the Republic 
of Korea has learned that a crisis can be contagious among emerging economies that 
have similarities in economic conditions and structures. However, when there are major 
failures in systemically important economies, the impact can be overwhelming 
regardless of the status of the domestic economy. The propagation of the crisis can be 
very rapid and widespread, owing to the growing economic and financial linkages with 
the rest of the world. 
 
Effective surveillance should not be confined to monitoring the domestic economy, but  
should also look at the economies of other regions and trends in international financial 
markets. The implication of growing global linkages and integration for operating an 
EWS is that it is desirable to expand the scope of surveillance to include the many 
important economies and financial markets around the world. If we limit surveillance to 
the domestic economy only, then such a surveillance will be able to capture the coming 
of crisis only at the contagion stage after the economy has already been seriously 
affected.  
 
Figure 8 illustrates some international financial indicators that could have been useful for 
predicting the recent crisis. Utilizing financial market indicators can be useful for 
monitoring crisis risks since they swiftly reflect market situations and investors’ 
sentiments, which often change from moment to moment, and they contain important 
information regarding market participants’ evaluations of crisis risks. Financial indicators 
are also useful considering many crises occur with financial phenomena such as a 
currency crisis, debt crisis, or banking crisis.   
                                            
16  The ratio of external trade (exports and imports) to gross national income (GNI). 
17  In 2007, the foreign investors’ share in the stock market capitalization was the third among OECD 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Early Warning Systems in the Republic of Korea  |   2526   |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 77 
 
The indicators in the panels
18 display the aggravations in financial market conditions 
around the period of the recent crisis. The bond market indicators show significant 
increases in the credit risks in the US, European, and emerging economies. The LIBOR-
OIS
19 spread demonstrates a distinctive deterioration in the interbank funding market 
from about a year before the crisis. The other indicators also exhibit increased volatilities 
in the international FX market and growing negative sentiments among market 
participants.  
 
Both qualitative and quantitative approaches can be employed for monitoring enlarged 
sets of economies and markets. Qualitative analysis should come first given the wide 
scope of surveillance and the approach’s merit of flexible and swift response to changing 
situations. The analysis should be able to explain what the sources of the problem are, 
how the problem has been developing, what its impacts will be on the domestic economy, 
and what the appropriate policy measures should be to deal with the problem.   
 
Quantitative analysis on such a wide scope can be intimidating and some parsimony in 
modeling is necessary. One may begin with a model composed of the most relevant and 
important indicators that well represent each region and financial sector. Or one can 
focus on the most serious and imminent risks identified by qualitative analysis and track 
the related indicators. Then, the coverage of quantitative models can be expanded as 
time, resources, and manpower allow. 
 
Finally, there may be the need for compromise between the rigor of methodologies and 
the practical need that all relevant aspects for detecting potential crises should be 
properly monitored. The basic problem is that the more we pursue methodological rigor 
in the models, the more we come to rely on past experiences. As a result, the important 
factors that might play a role in the next crisis may be missing from the surveillance 
targets. 
 
As explained before, the models that were based on the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis, 
which largely occurred due to domestic vulnerabilities, had limits in predicting the recent 
crisis caused by external factors. Also, some variables that would have been useful in 
detecting the US housing market bubble may not be useful in predicting the next crisis 
since the next crisis may develop in a different manner than the recent one.   
 
It is, therefore, desirable to try to reflect in a model the relevant factors necessary for 
crisis surveillance rather than adhere to methodological rigor. The evaluation of a model 
should be based not only on methodological criteria, but also on whether the model 
incorporates all the relevant factors that have the potential to affect the stability of the 
system and whether such a model emits risk signals that are appropriate for the situation. 
For the practical purposes of early warning, it is important that the model produce 
                                            
18  Embi+ is the index of premiums on emerging market bonds. CDX and iTraxx_Sovx are indexes of credit 
default swap premiums on North American corporate bonds and European sovereign bonds. LIBOR-OIS 
spread is the difference between the 3-month US LIBOR and overnight indexed swap rates. VIX, a 
popular measure of investors’ sentiments, reflects market expectation on the volatility of the S&P500 
over the next 30 days. The indicator for the FX market is the implied volatility of the 3-month euro–dollar 
FX option. 
19  London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and overnight index swap (OIS). Early Warning Systems in the Republic of Korea |  27 
 
historical behavior that is reasonably consistent with reality and intuitively suggests the 
potential dangers the economy may encounter ahead.   
 
(ii) More Attention on Structural Vulnerabilities 
 
The models operated in an EWS are generally for prediction of crisis occurrence. This 
objective deserves significant effort considering the harsh impact felt when a crisis is 
realized. However, predicting the exact timing of a crisis is extremely difficult. Further, a 
crisis can exert such a heavy impact because vulnerabilities have accumulated over an 
extended period of time that render the economy susceptible to shocks.   
 
For example, the underlying cause of the recent crisis and its unprecedented scale of 
financial losses can be found in the US housing market bubble that created large 
discrepancies between housing prices and economic fundamentals, with consequent 
overvaluations of financial commodities based on mortgage loans. The currency crises 
of some South American economies during the mid-1990s did not happen only because 
of sudden capital outflows seeking higher interest rates in the US, but also because of 
weak economic conditions caused by lax fiscal management and large public debts, 
along with overvalued domestic currencies and accumulations of large current account 
deficits.  
 
Vulnerabilities play an important role not only in the occurrence of crisis but also in its 
spillover. The panels in Figure 9 show that the economy of the Republic of Korea 
witnessed an increase in structural vulnerabilities in terms of foreign currency liquidity 
before the recent crisis. Short-term external debts jumped rapidly compared to the 
increase in FX reserves. Due to a fast increase in external debt and capital inflows, the 
net external asset position of the economy worsened, and its currency value measured 
by the real effective exchange rate was overestimated, resulting in the growing 
possibility of subsequent adjustment. The expansion of loan assets compared with the 
deposit base in the domestic banking sector led to the increasing demand for funds, 
which indirectly affected foreign currency liquidity. The ratio of short-term external debt to 
foreign exchange reserves ratio ascended to a higher level than in Asian peer countries. 
These vulnerabilities raised the level of risk to the economy, as recognized by market 
participants, and caused its currency to depreciate seriously during the crisis. 
 
Since the underlying vulnerabilities serve as preconditions for economic hardship and 
tend to precede the occurrence of a crisis, monitoring for structurally vulnerable sectors 
can be a good way to enhance the capability of an EWS. Apart from the purpose of crisis 
prediction, monitoring structural vulnerabilities might also be of use for maintaining the 
soundness of the economy, which is crucial to avoid the harsh consequence of 
economic crisis. It is known that the IMF largely focuses on monitoring vulnerabilities in 
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(iii) Reinforce Early Warning Systems with Various Methodologies 
 
In order to complement the existing models and enhance the capabilities of an EWS to 
detect the possibility of crisis, various methodologies and auxiliary models can be 
considered. As one way to improve the function of alerting policy makers in the case of 
crisis realization, stress tests of EWS models can be considered. One difficulty with crisis 
prediction is that from time to time a crisis realizes abruptly in a short period. Accordingly, 
it is already too late for policy makers to take any meaningful preventive actions. 
 
The surveillance unit first prepares a list of potential risks that the economy may 
encounter in the future and performs stress tests under the assumption of variables that 
are affected by a particular risk and the degree of impacts. Then, the assumed values 
are used as inputs to simulate the EWS model, and it can be observed to what degree of 
seriousness the assumed crisis event may affect the economy. The values of variables 
can be assumed qualitatively with reasonable sense and in comparisons with past 
experiences, or they can be produced using statistical models.   
 
Also, various financial indicators can be incorporated into quantitative models in order to 
enhance the performance of EWS. Most of the main EWS models operated in 
surveillance units rely on macroeconomic variables—such as exports, current account 
balance, industrial production, and monetary aggregates. However, various financial 
indicators—such as spreads, premiums on interest rates, and volatilities—measured by 
financial commodities are used by researchers and practitioners in the market as good 
measures of the financial and economic conditions. The financial indicators are also 
usually available in high frequency while macro-variables can be obtained with some or 
significant time lags. Difficulties with utilizing financial indicators are that they are 
sometimes too volatile or that they usually have a short time-series so that their behavior 
during past crises is not observed. One can consider a separate model composed of 
high frequency financial indicators for this purpose, such as a daily checkup of the 
market.  
 
Linkages among markets and economies also warrant serious attention. Understanding 
the channels through which a crisis in one economy is transferred to others is no less 
important than the prediction of the crisis itself. This is especially the case as the 
integration among regions and economies become more intensive and extensive. The 
volumes and structures of trade with particular regions and financial exposures through 
portfolio investments, borrowing, and lending should be well understood. Introducing 
quantitative measures of such linkages can be useful to capture the various risks and 
channels of spillover to which the economy may be exposed. 
 
(iv) Incorporate Qualitative Judgment Process 
 
Finally, it is desirable that an EWS incorporate a qualitative judgment process. As 
mentioned earlier, quantitative methodology, while rigorous and objective, generally 
relies on past experiences and may miss some important factors for predicting the next 
crisis. As qualitative analysis is able to supplement quantitative models by flexibly 
dealing with various economic events, a qualitative judgment process should be 
incorporated into the EWS to assess the appropriateness of the warning signals  
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compared with the actual situation of the economy. If the quantitative model fails to 
produce warning signals for threats the economy is facing, the qualitative judgment 
process can directly issue a warning. Or, when the model overstates the true status of 
the economy, the qualitative judgment process can adjust the warning level properly 
according to the situation. 
 
Qualitative judgment can be introduced in many different ways. The surveillance unit can 
adjust warning levels itself, or through a committee of economic experts from 
organizations such as economic research institutes, central bank, and financial 
supervisory authorities. The adjustment of warning levels can be limited or limitless.   
 
Combining a qualitative approach into quantitative models can deal with the problems of 
qualitative analysis as well. By making an explicit choice of warning level, the ambiguity 
and vagueness that tend to be present in qualitative assessment can be overcome.   
 
In a world that is becoming more and more integrated, economic phenomena are 
involved in more complicated and changeable manners. The surveillance unit has more 
objects to monitor and more relationships between more variables to consider. 
Incorporating a qualitative judgment process into an EWS can be an effective way of 
coping with the changing nature of economic environments while also maintaining the 
objectivity and rigor of quantitative methodologies. 
 
 
4.  Message Delivery and Policy Guidance 
 
(i) Establish Communication Channels to Deliver Messages to Every Stakeholder 
 
In addition to the completion of effective surveillance tools, a national surveillance 
process must aim to have a direct influence on senior policy makers for intended policy 
responses. To this end, first and foremost, it is recommended to build a direct and 
periodic reporting channel for end-consumers of the surveillance reports. 
 
In particular, reporting via middle-level officials might obstruct the flow of precise 
information since they tend to water down the seriousness of the economic surveillance 
results. To avoid this, direct contact between a surveillance unit and senior policy makers 
on a periodic basis is strongly recommended. 
 
In the meantime, a national surveillance unit should also pay attention to keeping parallel 
dialogue channels with other stakeholders in place. They should try to strengthen efforts 
for collaboration with other national surveillance units in the region and international 
institutions like AMRO and the IMF, as proper surveillance of an EWS requires not only 
detecting country-level vulnerabilities, but also taking a close look at the vulnerabilities of 
other regions and their possible evolution into broader systemic risks, as well as cross-
border and inter-market spillovers. 
 
It is desirable that national surveillance units in individual countries have the opportunity 
to exchange views on economic issues and discuss measures to cope with discovered   
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vulnerabilities. Peer reviews of surveillance activities and outcomes will contribute to 
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the national surveillance mechanism as a 
whole. 
 
Also, national surveillance units can cooperate with international institutions, such as 
AMRO and the IMF, in an effort to supplement their activities through information sharing 
and a mutual evaluation process. National surveillance units could be helped in fostering 
their technical expertise and in recognizing economic vulnerabilities of broader regions 
with possible spillover effects. Drawing on the outputs of international institutions should 
strengthen national surveillance units rather than act as a substitute for their own 
assessments. Such cooperation can help the international institutions as well in better 
understanding a particular country’s economic situations. 
 
The roles of international institutions can be important in cooperation among surveillance 
units. Since the operations of most national surveillance units are conducted in a 
confidential manner, international institutions committed with common interests have an 
advantage in bringing forth more open discussions. International institutions could have 
informal yet regular meetings with national surveillance units and discuss surveillance 
outcomes; for example, when they visit member countries on a surveillance mission.   
 
Active communication and cooperation among the three layers of surveillance—IMF 
(global), AMRO (regional), and national surveillance units (national)—would ensure 
monitoring of a specific economy from various perspectives and angles. Moreover, a 
broader and multilateral perspective would underscore that ensuring the orderly flow of 
economic and financial resources across borders is a joint responsibility, which needs to 
be taken into account among the policy choices.   
 
(ii) Promote Independence of the Surveillance Unit 
 
The final stage of surveillance activities for a national surveillance unit includes providing 
policy advice based on its analysis on how to address identified problems. To realize 
such a purpose properly, a national surveillance unit should be independent in order to 
work objectively and impartially, particularly when signs of crisis are brewing. If a national 
surveillance unit is to play a significant role in accomplishing its purpose, its staff should 
be provided not only with incentives, but also with whistle-blowing immunity when raising 
issues that policy makers may find uncomfortable to openly discuss. Whether to allow 
the free flow of information related to the surveillance results will decide the success or 
failure of an EWS. In other words, a national surveillance unit free from the influence of 
the authorities will be one key to an effective crisis prevention mechanism. 
 
Independence, however, does not necessarily mean that the national surveillance unit 
can open its surveillance to the public without any restrictions. As explained before, this 
might confuse economic players, possibly leading to a self-fulfilling prophecy. Since the 
primary objective of the surveillance unit is early detection of the risk factors in the 
economy and recommendation of policy measures to prevent a crisis, the end-consumer 
of the surveillance report should be the authorities rather than the market or the public. 
From this perspective, independence should be limited to ensuring trust in a surveillance 
model and free message delivery to senior policy makers.  
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Lastly, the people in charge of surveillance need to continuously build upon their 
capabilities to ensure independence of the surveillance unit. Otherwise, the authorities 
would not have full confidence in the surveillance output and the independence of the 
surveillance unit could ultimately be harmed and threatened. Capacity building is also 
necessary for the policy makers to ensure effective communication and informed policy 
decisions. Hence, it will be of great use to establish a program to develop the capacity of 
all those involved in surveillance. This can be an area for international cooperation as 
capacity building is one of the most basic and common interests among national 
surveillance units. 
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